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INTRODUCTION 
In the first issue of this volume, the Maryland Law Review pub-
lished a symposium exploring the history, interpretation, and modern 
implications of the Thirteenth Amendment.  This Amendment une-
quivocally ended the most abhorrent and inhumane institution in 
American history along with its “badges and incidents.”  Several ar-
ticles in that symposium suggested that the language of the Thir-
teenth Amendment could also eradicate certain contemporary injus-
tices.1  In this final issue of the volume, the Maryland Law Review 
features a symposium building upon that theme by asking whether 
social and political injustice that is either furthered or tolerated un-
der the current Constitution can be eradicated by that same Constitu-
tion, or if such injustice renders the Constitution an “agreement with 
hell.”2
Professor Jack M. Balkin believes that the Constitution can be re-
deemed in its current iteration.  This is the premise of Professor Bal-
kin’s recent book, and impetus for this symposium, Constitutional Re-
   
 
 1. Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and the Legacy of 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83 (2011); Julie Novkov, The 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Meaning of Familial Bonds, 71 MD. L. REV. 203 (2011); James 
Pope, What’s Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 
189 (2011).  
 2. See WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD 
GARRISON 205 (1963) (quoting William Lloyd Garrison). 
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demption: Political Faith in an Unjust World.3  There is a qualified hope 
in Constitutional Redemption: We redeemed the Constitution in the 
past, and we can do it again.4  But what if the Constitution cannot be 
redeemed and really is an “agreement with hell?”  Professor Sanford 
Levinson believes that a constitutional convention needs to be called 
for a substantial revision or redrafting of the Constitution.  At one 
time, Professor Levinson had faith that the Constitution could remedy 
the injustices and inequities that it perpetrates and permits.  He no 
longer shares Professor Balkin’s optimism, as the revised edition of 
Levinson’s Constitutional Faith makes clear.5  In his contribution to this 
Symposium, Professor Levinson writes, “I believe that the Constitution 
has saddled us with a fundamentally defective political system.”6
The articles in this Symposium were written for a conference cel-
ebrating the publication of Balkin’s Constitutional Redemption and the 
republication of Levinson’s Constitutional Faith at the University of 
Texas School of Law on October 21–22, 2011.  While none of the au-
thors unequivocally subscribe to either Balkin’s or Levinson’s view-
points on the Constitution, all fall somewhere along the spectrum 
spanning the hope of constitutional redemption and the dismay of a 
failed promise.  These articles provide insightful commentary on 
modern constitutional theory, political power, and how the American 
public interprets the Constitution. 
 
Professor Aziz Rana cautions that adherence to constitutional 
continuity can foster injustices just as easily as constitutional rupture, 
and that on certain occasions breaking with constitutional continuity 
may be more beneficial to progressive causes.7  Rana suggests that af-
ter the Civil War a break with constitutional continuity may have jetti-
soned remnants of colonialism that persist in the Constitution today.8  
Professor Jamal Greene questions the merit of constitutional continu-
ity by identifying recurring inconsistencies in originalist constitutional 
interpretation, notably originalists’ curious neglect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the intentions of its framers.9
 
 3. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011). 
   
 4. See Jack M. Balkin, The Distribution of Political Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 1144 (2012). 
 5. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (rev. ed. 2011) (1988); Sanford 
Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956 (2012). 
 6. Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, supra note 5, at 976. 
 7. Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71 MD. L. REV. 
1015, 1019–20 (2012).  
 8. Id. at 1020. 
 9. Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 980–81  
(2012). 
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Focusing on democratic social movements, Professors Gerald 
Torres and Lani Guinier argue that Balkin’s theory of constitutional 
redemption underestimates the importance of the common people 
(as opposed to political elites) as sources of constitutional change and 
constitutional legitimacy.10  Torres and Guinier elaborate on their 
concept of “demosprudence” in order to illustrate how social move-
ments influence the law and governing institutions, especially in times 
of social crisis.11
Perhaps the most centrist views on constitutional redemption be-
long to Professor Mark Graber.  Graber pragmatically states that some 
compromises in the Constitution may lead to less than ideal out-
comes, but in the end, those mediocre outcomes may be better than 
no compromise at all.
 
12  For Graber, this tradeoff is acceptable so long 
as the compromise does not benefit one group to the exclusion of 
another group absent from the bargaining process, something Graber 
describes as a “really rotten deal.”13  The nature of compromises with-
in the Constitution does not trouble Professor H.W. Perry, Jr., who 
agrees with much of Balkin’s theory of constitutional redemption, but 
is less hopeful that we can achieve it.  Perry argues there are more ob-
stacles to change today than ever before, with the public and politi-
cians less willing to challenge the Supreme Court’s authority.14  And-
rew Koppelman, whose contribution to the symposium continues his 
tradition of insulting Jack Balkin in the titles of his work, considers 
what moral philosophy can teach us about respect for each other’s 
conceptions of a common Constitution—if we can agree such a doc-
ument exists at all.15
The Maryland Law Review thanks the authors for contributing to 
this Symposium.  We also thank Professor Jack Balkin and Professor 
Sanford Levinson for allowing us to participate in and publish the ar-
ticles from the conference on Constitutional Redemption and Constitu-
tional Faith. 
   
  
NATALIE A. WARYCK 
 
 10. Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories About We the 
People, 71 MD. L. REV. 1052, 1064–66 (2012).  
 11. Id. at 1068.  
 12. Mark A. Graber, Redeeming and Living with Evil, 71 MD. L. REV. 1073, 1085–89 
(2012).  
 13. Id. at 1081.  
 14. H.W. Perry, Jr., Constitutional Faith, Constitutional Redemption, and Political Science: 
Can Faith and Political Science Coexist?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1098, 1107–20 (2012).   
 15. Andrew Koppelman, Respect and Contempt in Constitutional Law, or, Is Jack Balkin 
Heartbreaking?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1126, 1130–34 (2012). 
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